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本文对国内外演化博弈论的发展动态进行了较系统的综述,指出演化博弈论以及演化博弈模型的基本特征,并从方法论、认识论、时间的不可逆性、随机因素、选择机制及均衡等方面进一步说明了演化博弈论在经济学领域的应用价值及应用前景。
Abstract：This paper makes a broad survey on the recent progress of the evolutionary game theory and points out the character istics of evolutionary game theory, comparing evolutionary game theory with game theory from methodology, epistemology, irreversible time, basic concept, selection mechanism and equilibrium.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2005.08.002
中图分类号:F224.3
引用信息:
[1]易余胤,刘汉民.经济研究中的演化博弈理论[J].商业经济与管理,2005(08):8-13.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2005.08.002.
基金信息:
广东省自然科学基金(04300708); 暨南大学引进人才科研启动基金(51104650)资助项目
2005-08-25
2005-08-25