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文章首先基于期望激励理论，系统分析经济增长和环境保护多目标任务下，地方官员的努力选择如何通过影响政治绩效进而影响晋升的作用机制。然后，基于手工收集的2007—2021年中国地级市政府官员职位变动数据，实证考察了多目标任务下经济努力和环境努力对地方政府官员晋升概率的具体影响。结果发现：在样本期内，经济努力对地级市市长晋升概率的影响并不显著，但环境努力却可以显著提升市长晋升概率。生态环境责任一票否决机制的实施使环境努力在地方政府官员晋升考核中的正向作用得以强化，而片面追求经济发展的作用则被弱化。异质性分析显示，资源型城市、非新能源示范城市和北方城市的官员更容易通过强化环境努力获得晋升，而经济努力对地方政府官员的晋升并未呈现出显著的异质性影响。机制检验发现，环境努力主要通过提高相对环境绩效来促进地方官员晋升。进一步的拓展性分析还表明，环境努力虽然会影响地方政府官员晋升概率，但并不会显著提升地方政府官员晋升速度。同时，公众环境关注度的提升会强化环境努力对官员晋升的促进作用。此外，长远来看，地方政府官员的晋升激励变革还有利于推动区域经济—环境协调发展。
Abstract：This study first systematically analyzes' based on expectancy theory' the mechanism through which local officials' effort allocation between economic growth and environmental protection' as dual performance objectives' shapes politicalperformance and ultimately affects career advancement. Using manually collected data on the job rotations of Chinese prefectural-level city officials from 2007 to 2021' we empirically examine the specific impact of economic effort and environmental effort on thepromotion probability of local government officials under multi-task objectives. The results indicate that' during the sample period'economic effort did not significantly affect the promotion probability of mayors' whereas environmental effort significantly increasedit. The implementation of the “one-vote veto” system for ecological and environmental responsibility has strengthened the positiverole of environmental effort in promotion evaluations' while weakening the effect of single-minded pursuit of economic growth.Heterogeneity analysis reveals that officials in resource-based cities' non-new energy demonstration cities' and northern cities aremore likely to be promoted by intensifying environmental efforts' whereas economic effort shows no significant heterogeneous impacton promotion. Mechanism tests confirm that environmental effort primarily promotes officials' advancement by improving relativeenvironmental performance. Further extended analysis shows that while environmental effort affects promotion probability' it does notsignificantly accelerate the pace of promotion. Additionally' increased public environmental concern strengthens the positive effect ofenvironmental effort on promotion. In the long run' reforms in the promotion incentive structure for local officials are conducive topromoting coordinated regional economic-environmental development.
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(1)标尺竞争理论指出,由于缺乏地方官员能力的信息,选民将观察当地官员与其他地区官员的相对绩效表现,以此判断本地区的政府效率。已有研究将该理论应用于中国政府治理问题,指出在政治集权的情境下,中央政府扮演了“选民”的角色。
(2)由于经济努力对官员晋升无显著影响,内生性处理不考虑经济努力的问题。
(3)如制度背景所述,虽然2007年国务院发布了《国务院关于印发节能减排综合性工作方案的通知》,提出把生态文明建设作为政府领导干部综合考核的重要内容。但由于此文件未明确提出官员晋升制度中关于环境绩效评价权重的改革。而2013年《关于改进地方党政领导班子和领导干部政绩考核工作的通知》的出台才标志着官员晋升激励权重改革的开始。
基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2025.09.006
中图分类号:D630.3
引用信息:
[1]张兵兵,董安然,曹历娟.多目标任务下官员努力选择与晋升激励[J].商业经济与管理,2025,No.407(09):78-91.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2025.09.006.
基金信息:
江苏省社会科学基金重大项目“新质生产力与产业深度转型升级研究”(24ZD005); 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“农村现代化视阈下的中国农村经济管理学理论创新研究”(2024JZDZ061); 江苏省高校哲学社会科学实验室建设项目“南京农业大学‘大食物安全治理与政策智能实验室’”