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财务真实性是资本市场健康发展的基础，财务舞弊会严重误导投资者的价值判断和投资决策，不利于资本市场健康稳定。基于我国2010—2022年A股上市企业面板数据，从投资者互动质量与互动效率两个方面实证考察投资者互动对企业财务舞弊的作用机制。研究发现：投资者互动对企业财务舞弊具有显著的抑制作用，改善投资者互动质量与互动效率能够有效抑制企业财务舞弊。投资者互动可以通过降低债务成本与提高企业会计信息披露质量来抑制企业财务舞弊。投资者互动质量对小企业、非国有企业、股权分散企业与内部控制有效企业的影响更大，投资者互动效率对大企业、非国有企业、股权分散企业与内部控制有效企业的财务舞弊影响更大。进一步研究发现，代理成本与投资者互动会共同发挥作用抑制企业财务舞弊，而高管薪酬与投资者互动质量的交互效应显著，但与投资者互动效率的交互效应不显著。
Abstract：Financial integrity is the cornerstone of a healthy capital market. Financial fraud can severely mislead investors' value judgments and investment decisions, thereby undermining the stability and healthy development of capital markets. Using panel data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2022, this study empirically investigates the mechanism through which investor interaction — particularly its quality and efficiency — affects corporate financial fraud. The results show that investor interaction significantly inhibits corporate financial fraud, and improving both the quality and efficiency of investor interaction effectively strengthens this deterrent effect. Investor interaction suppresses financial fraud by reducing debt costs and enhancing the quality of corporate accounting information disclosure. The effect of interaction quality is more pronounced in small firms, non-stateowned enterprises, firms with dispersed ownership, and firms with effective internal controls. In contrast, interaction efficiency exerts a stronger impact on financial fraud in large firms, non-state-owned enterprises, firms with dispersed ownership, and firms with effective internal controls. Further analysis reveals that agency costs and investor interaction jointly work to curb corporate financial fraud. Moreover, the interaction between executive compensation and interaction quality is significant, whereas its interaction with interaction efficiency is not.
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(1)相关性分析不在正文中展示,留备待索。
基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2026.04.002
中图分类号:F275;F832.51
引用信息:
[1]孙光林,方继明,史丹.投资者互动与资本市场健康发展：基于企业财务舞弊视角[J].商业经济与管理,2026,No.414(04):17-36.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2026.04.002.
基金信息:
辽宁省社会科学规划基金重点项目“数字政府建设对资本市场定价效率的治理机制、治理效果及优化路径研究”(L24AJY003)
2026-05-27
2026
2026-05-27
2026-06-03
2026
1
2026-04-15
2026-04-15