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针对放松卖空管制能否抑制经理人私利问题,文章借助我国融资融券制度逐步推行提供的准自然实验机会,采取双重差分法研究了卖空压力对公司经理人私有收益的影响。研究发现,卖空压力显著抑制了经理人的私有收益,在进行了多项稳健性检验之后,该结论依旧成立。进一步的研究中文章还发现,卖空压力对经理人私有收益的抑制作用在信息透明度高、经理人权力较大、行业竞争激烈的公司中表现得更为明显。结论表明,作为一种外部治理机制,融资融券业务带来的卖空压力缓解了公司内部的委托代理问题。
Abstract：The issue of whether relaxing short-selling regulation disciplines managers' private benefits is of critical importance.This paper,with the aid of phase margin trading system launched in China which provides a quasi-natural experimental setting,uses the difference-in-difference method to study the influence of short-selling pressure on managers' private benefits in a company. The study finds that short-selling pressure significantly disciplines managers' private benefits,and the conclusion remains tenable after a number of robustness tests. In further researches,we also find that the discipline on managers' private benefits from short-selling pressure is much more significant when the information transparency is higher,or the executive power is larger,or the competition of industry which companies belong to is fiercer. Conclusions of this paper indicate that as an external governance mechanism,shortselling pressure caused by margin trading relieves the principal/agent problem within the company.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2018.07.006
中图分类号:F832.51
引用信息:
[1]邵毅平,路军.卖空压力抑制经理人私有收益吗?——基于中国放松卖空管制的准自然实验[J].商业经济与管理,2018,No.321(07):58-67.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2018.07.006.
基金信息:
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(15YJA630054); 浙江省哲学社会科学基金一般项目(18NDJC136YB)
2018-07-15
2018-07-15