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家族企业代际传承已经成为学术界和实务界关注的一个焦点。文章尝试建立一个风险分析框架,深入分析代际传承对企业风险承担的影响机理及经济后果。基于2004-2016年我国沪深两市A股上市家族企业的研究数据,文章以家族二代继任者成为董事长或总经理的时点作为代际传承始点进行实证分析。研究结果表明:家族企业进入代际传承实施期后,企业风险承担水平会降低。与"家族—家族"类别的接班方式相比,在"职业—家族"类别的接班方式下,代际传承对企业风险承担水平的负效应更明显;创始人弱参与下的企业风险承担水平低于创始人强参与下的企业风险承担水平。此外,代际传承通过企业风险承担这项路径还会引起企业会计绩效下降。
Abstract：The inter-generational succession of family businesses has become a focus of study in the academia and the practical fields. This paper attempts to establish a risk analysis framework to deeply analyze the impact mechanism and economic consequences of intergenerational succession on corporate risk-taking capacity. Based on the research data of A-share listed family enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2004-2016, this paper takes the time when the successor of the second generation of the family becomes the chairman or general manager as the starting point of inter-generational inheritance. The results indicate that after a family business enters the implementation period of inter-generational succession, the risk-taking capacity of the enterprise will decrease. Further research shows that the inter-generational succession model of the "family-family" category can reduce the risk-taking capacity of the enterprise in comparison with the inter-generational succession model of the "occupation-family" category; and under the mode of inter-generational succession of weak participation, corporate risk-taking level is weaker in contrast with the mode of inter-generational succession of strong participation. Finally, this approach of inter-generational succession concerning enterprise risk-taking capacity causes the decline in corporate accounting performance.
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(1)本文也采用另外一种观测期(t年至t+2年)计算企业风险承担水平重新对回归模型进行检验,回归结果并没有改变本文的主要研究发现。
(2)本文也采用交互项模型进行回归,结果并没有改变。
基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2019.03.005
中图分类号:F276.5;F272.3
引用信息:
[1]许永斌,鲍树琛.代际传承对家族企业风险承担的影响[J].商业经济与管理,2019,No.329(03):50-60.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2019.03.005.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重点项目“中国家族企业代际传承的财务安排研究”(14AGL009)
2019-03-15
2019-03-15