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在互联网相关市场，商品定价模式由统一定价模式和群体化价格歧视模式逐渐转向个别化价格歧视模式，“禁止差别待遇”规则面临个别化价格歧视行为的挑战。首先，个别化价格歧视行为引发了价格歧视型共谋行为。“禁止差别待遇”规则应采用“信息交流”与“知悉规则”的双重标准审查此类特殊的共谋行为。其次，个别化价格歧视行为开始伪装为动态定价行为，“禁止差别待遇”规则应当引入“相当性”规则区分两类行为。最后，个别化价格歧视行为在损害部分消费者利益的同时增加了市场效率，相关经济分析标准难以判断个别化价格歧视行为正当性。“禁止差别待遇”规则应当在损害分析与效率分析的基础上引入正当性综合审查。
Abstract：With the change of commodity pricing mode from unified pricing mode and group price discrimination mode to individual price discrimination mode,the regulation of“prohibition of differential treatment”in the industrial age to adjust the individual price discrimination behavior in the Internet age has caused many problems. First of all,the individualized price discrimination behavior leads to a brand-new collusion behavior of price discrimination. The“prohibition of differential treatment”rule should follow the double standards of“information exchange”and“knowledge rule”to examine price discrimination collusion. Secondly,individualized price discrimination leads to the confusion of dynamic pricing behavior and individualized price discrimination behavior.The“prohibition of differential treatment”rule should follow the“equivalence”rule to distinguish the two kinds of behavior. Furthermore,the individualized price discrimination behavior damages the interests of some consumers but increases the market efficiency,which leads to the contradiction of relevant economic analysis standards. The“prohibition of differential treatment”rule should be comprehensively examined on the basis of damage analysis and efficiency analysis.
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(1)胡某某诉上海某商务有限公司纠纷案,浙江省绍兴市柯桥区人民法院(2021)浙法0603民初790号一审民事判决书。
(2)当商品价格低于消费者支付意愿时,经营者无法攫取最大化的消费者剩余。当商品价格高于消费者的支付意愿时,消费者会失去交易意愿,经营者失去全部交易收益。
(3)United States v.Topkins,No.CR15-00201.N.D.Cal.2015.
(4)Eturas and others,2016 ECLI-42 Case C-74/14.
(5)《平台经济领域的反垄断指南》第9条规定:“认定平台经济领域协同行为,可以通过直接证据判定是否存在协同行为的事实。如果直接证据较难获取,可以根据《禁止垄断协议暂行规定》第6条的规定,按照逻辑一致的间接证据,认定经营者对相关信息的知悉状况,判定经营者之间是否存在协同行为。经营者可以提供相反证据证明其不存在协同行为。”
(6)《平台经济领域的反垄断指南》第17条规定:“……平台经济领域经营者实施差别待遇行为可能具有以下正当理由:(1)根据交易相对人实际需求且符合正当的交易习惯和行业惯例,实行不同交易条件;(2)针对新用户在合理期限内开展的优惠活动;(3)基于平台公平、合理、无歧视的规则实施的随机性交易;(4)能够证明行为具有正当性的其他理由。”
基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2022.11.005
中图分类号:D922.294
引用信息:
[1]苏新建,沈运峰.个别化价格歧视的规制难题及其纾解——基于“禁止差别待遇”规则的分析[J].商业经济与管理,2022,No.373(11):60-70.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2022.11.005.
基金信息:
浙江省软科学研究计划一般项目(2022C35020)