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数据隐私通常被视为产品质量的一部分,可以通过反垄断法的实施来提升对其的保护程度。但是,对于互联网企业而言,由于双边市场的特质,需要通过获取用户数据来提供服务。竞争的加剧会使得企业需要更多的数据来获得竞争优势。对于用户来说,由于数据获取的隐蔽性、认知的局限性以及对于产品价格过度敏感,充分的竞争也难以让用户选择隐私保护程度更高的企业。正是由于市场竞争存在这些局限性,所以通过反垄断法很难实现提升隐私保护的效果。
Abstract:Data privacy is usually regarded as a part of product quality, the protection of which can be improved by the implementation of the antitrust law. For firms, however, the nature of the two-sided market requires access to the user data for providing services. The aggravation of competition will increase the firms' demand for more data to gain competitive advantage. For users, due to the concealment strategy of data acquisition, cognitive limitations and over-sensitivity to product prices, it is also difficult to choose the firms with higher level of privacy protection in the competitive market. Because of these limitations of competition, improving data privacy protection through antitrust law is impossible.
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①相关文献中将隐私受侵害主体指称为“消费者”,但考虑到消费者在法律领域中有特定含义,行文中统一用“用户”指代。本文中的“用户”除非特别说明,主要指个人用户。“数据隐私”这一术语主要强调数字化和个人互联网用户隐私之间的关联,因此侵害主体限于通过互联网接触用户隐私的企业。对这些企业,不同文献也有“互联网企业”“经营者”“平台”“互联网平台”“数据平台”等不同提法,并涉及不同的法规、指南中不同的称谓。限于本文探讨的主题,本文以“互联网企业”为主,以“数据平台”为辅来指称这些企业。
(1)反垄断法理论上通常将这些领域作为反垄断法“适用除外”的领域。
(2)不同学术文献中隐私、数据、个人信息等概念大多做同义使用。本文主要强调互联网企业对于消费者个人信息搜集使用所带来的竞争法问题,因此更多采用“数据隐私”。
(3)不过,将数据视为一种支付手段的观点具有误导性。因为与金钱不同的是,同一数据可以多次与多个用户共享。即使用户为特定服务“支付”数据,用户可用的数据量也不会减少。
(4)2016年3月,德国竞争管理机构对Facebook展开调查,指控其对用户的不当数据收集可能导致市场力量被滥用。
(5)平台通常具有两边(Two-sided)或多边(Multi-sided)市场,出于行文的方便,统一称为双边市场。此外,双边市场的定义一直以来也存在争议,因而对双边市场范围的大小有不同的看法。
(6)要注意的是,双边市场概念较为宽泛,事实上包含了不同类型的平台。
(7)A.有效率的价格结构应当确定在反映相关成本的基准上;B.较高的价格—成本边际是市场力量的反映;C.价格低于边际成本是掠夺性定价;D.竞争的增加必然导致更有效率的价格结构;E.竞争的增加必然导致更加平衡的价格结构;F.在成熟市场(或者网络市场)中,不反映成本的结构不是公平的;G.双边市场中的一边低于边际成本接受服务时,它必定从另一边的使用者那里接受了交叉补贴;H.对于双边市场平台设定的价格进行管制是竞争中性的。
基本信息:
DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2021.05.007
中图分类号:D922.294
引用信息:
[1]李剑.互联网反垄断能促进数据隐私保护吗?[J].商业经济与管理,2021,No.355(05):85-97.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2021.05.007.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金一般项目“中国反垄断法的移植与本土化研究”(18BFX150)
2021-05-15
2021-05-15