商业经济与管理

针对主流电商平台的预售监管政策的变化，探讨了平台监管、商家预售策略和消费者购买决策是如何相互影响，经过动态调整逐步形成长期格局等问题。构建了三方演化博弈模型，通过理论分析和仿真讨论了可能的均衡以及稳定性。结果表明，在不同条件下三方共同演化可能会形成三种稳定均衡，其中两种均衡存在改进的可能。平台监管起到了主导性的作用，可以通过实施精确监管，规范交易秩序，合理处罚违规行为引导商家合规预售，营造良好的环境吸引消费者，对电商生态进行优化。但优化路径受到监管成本等条件的限制，需要平衡成本、收益以及对其他两方的影响。同时也需要注意其他平台的政策变化，不断调整监管策略来保持竞争力。研究结果可用于分析预售监管政策实施后可能形成的格局和走向，提出改进方案，有助于推动预售市场的健康发展。

Inspired by recent changes of supervision policies in advance selling on mainstream e-commerce platforms,this paper discusses how platform policies,retailers' strategies and consumer purchase decisions affecteach other,adjust and form longterm trends. A tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed,and the possible equilibrium and stability are discussed through theoretical analysis and simulation. The results show that three stable equilibriums of different qualities may evolve under different conditions and two of them can be improved. The three parties worked together to build the equilibrium,but the platform supervision plays a leading role. A better equilibrium can be achieved by implementing precise supervision,standardizing transaction,punishing violations to guide retailers to comply with the rules,and creating a good environment to attract consumers. However,platform supervision is limited by costs and other conditions,and may not be optimal. Platforms need to balance costs,benefits,and impacts on the other two parties. Meanwhile,it is also necessary to pay attention to the policy changes of external competitive platforms and constantly adjust regulatory strategies to maintain their advantage. The research results can be used to analyze the trend of supervision policies of advance selling,propose solution plans,and help promote the healthy development of the market.