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店内促销可由零售商负责,也可由生产商负责,但不同的促销安排会产生不同的渠道结果。不负责促销的渠道成员免费搭车弱化了促销激励,但相互间的转移支付补偿有助于缓解这种激励扭曲。引入了促销效果的博弈分析表明:在产品促销效果很好的情况下,零售商促销是最优的;随着促销效果下降,为实现渠道最优的零售商促销,生产商必须向零售商支付通道费补偿;如果促销效果足够差,以至于生产商从促销中获利不足以支付零售商索要的通道费补偿,最优安排变成生产商促销,零售商支付促销补偿或提供促销支持。这一方面解释了通道费是生产商对零售商促销成本的补偿,另一方面也说明通道费作为一种促销补偿形式是可逆转的,从而解释了零售商店内的厂家促销现象。针对消费者剩余的扩展分析表明,渠道最优的促销安排也同时导致了消费者剩余的最大化。通道费(或促销补偿)作为实现最优促销安排的协调机制,在提高企业利润的同时,也间接地改进了消费者福利。
Abstract：In-store promotions can be performed either by the retailer or by the manufacturer,leading different results for the channel. The free-riding by a channel member not performing promotions can weaken the partner's promotion incentive,but this distortion can be mitigated through transfer payment between them. Considering promotion effectiveness in a game model,we find that the retailer being in charge of promotions is optimal when the promotion has a good effect; with the decline of promotion effectiveness,the manufacturer must pay the retailer slotting allowances as compensation in order to achieve the optimal result; but the optimal arrangement will convert into the manufacturer being in charge of promotion and the retailer paying compensation or providing support if the promotion effectiveness is small enough. This shows that slotting allowances are compensations the manufacturer pays for the retailer's promotions on the one hand,and that they are alternatives for promotion compensation on the other hand,thereby explaining the phenomenon of the manufacturer's in-store-promotions. Moreover,extending the model to consumer surplus,we find that optimal channel promotion arrangement as a whole is also leading the maximum of consumer surplus. Slotting allowances or promotion compensation,as a coordination mechanism to achieve optimal promotion arrangement,can indirectly improve consumer welfare at the same time increasing firm profit.
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(1)从免费搭车角度,即便促销效果很好的产品,零售商和生产商也可能达成通道费协议,实际考察和观测证明了这种可能性。但是差别在于此时通道费不是零售商促销的必要条件。
(2)为了名称上区分方便,在本文表述中,生产商向零售商支付费用,我们称之为“通道费”,零售商向生产商支付费用,我们称之为“促销补偿”。
(1)一些政府管理部门在处理工商企业纠纷时经常以此观点否定通道费。
(2)参见商务部2014年委托上海商情信息中心作为独立机构实施的第三方调查报告《基于交易关系的零售商供应商双向满意度调查报告》,http://www.bis.net.cn/NewsI nfo.aspx?classid=65&&aid=452。
(1)从技术上看,由于他们假定了零售商与生产商在确定批发价格时服从纳什议价规则,导致模型难以扩展至零售商负责促销的情况。
(2)假定具体的函数形式只不过为了分析简便,实际上促销成本函数只需满足C'(e)>0、C″(e)>0就足够,表示促销上的报酬递减。再者,促销应该通过消费者效用而反映于需求函数,导致需求函数变成q=v+f(ξ,e)-p,但这样在技术分析上将更加复杂。本文设定只是为了简化分析,如果限制消费者效用而不是限制促销成本,结果的性质不会改变。实际上可以把ξ理解为产品需求对促销努力的敏感性,ξ越大,产品需求对促销努力的敏感性越低;ξ越小,产品需求对促销努力的敏感性越高。
(1)在本文利润符号的下标中,r表示零售商,m表示生产商;如果有r、m两个字母,前面的表示促销主体,后面的表示主体利润。如rr表示零售商促销时零售商利润,rm表示零售商促销时生产商利润,mr表示生产商促销时零售商利润,mm表示生产商促销时生产商利润。
(1)由于前文已经假定ξ取值大于0.5,所以这里在讨论ξ取值范围时不再重复这一点。当然,还有ξ→+∞的情况,这时促销与不促销无差异,本文不详细讨论。
(2)为了避免曲线过多导致识别混乱,图中略去了没有促销时的情况。
(1)这种情况下零售商是否收取通道费以及收取数额,依赖于零售商的公平偏好程度、议价势力以及促销的外溢效应(比如吸引注意力、增加人气及客流量等)。为了集中主题,本文不做详细论述。
基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2018.02.001
中图分类号:F274
引用信息:
[1]李陈华,晏维龙,徐振宇,等.促销效果、最优促销安排及其福利效应——兼论通道费的补偿作用[J].商业经济与管理,2018,No.316(02):5-15.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2018.02.001.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金项目“通道费的理论、经验与选择性规制”(16BJY119);“江苏省重点序列学科——应用经济学”(苏政办发[2014]37号)
2018-02-15
2018-02-15