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文章以2010—2015年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,从企业发展的动态角度探讨在不同的企业生命周期环境下,控制权转移能否抑制内部控制重大缺陷,并进而提升企业绩效。研究发现:内部控制重大缺陷导致企业绩效的降低,而控制权转移具有抑制作用,但是其抑制程度会因为企业生命周期的不同阶段而产生差异。研究表明,我国上市公司的控制权转移作为一种外部治理机制,尽管具有抑制内部控制重大缺陷对于企业绩效的负面作用,但是这种作用受到企业生命周期的重要影响。企业要密切联系企业的经营状况,根据各个生命周期的不同特征,科学合理地选择控制权转移,有的放矢地发挥外部治理机制的作用。
Abstract：Based on the dynamic perspective in enterprise life cycle,this paper analyzes whether control right transfer inhibit material weaknesses in internal control for the improvement of the enterprise performance through the study of the empirical data from Chinese A-share listed companies during the period from 2010 to 2015. We find that material weaknesses in internal control reduce the enterprise performance. Control transfer right has an inhibitory effect. However,the inhibition effect behaves differently during the different stages of the enterprise life cycle. The research results show that the transfer of control right of listed companies in China is an external governance mechanism. Although it has an inhibitory function on the negative effects of material weaknesses in in-ternal control on enterprise performance,this function is affected by the important impact of the enterprise life cycle. It also reminds that managers should take the operating conditions of the enterprise into consideration when they make decisions,and choose the transfer of control right according to the different characteristics of enterprise life cycle for the effective function of the role of the external governance mechanism.
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(1)信息假说具有两种形式,一种认为收购活动散布了目标公司股价被低估的信息,会促使市场对这些股票重新估价,目标公司和其他各方不用采取特别的行动来促使价值的重估,这被称作是“坐在金矿上”的解释。另一种形式是认为收购会激励目标公司的管理层在公司自身上改善战略,提高管理效率,这是“背后鞭策”的解释。
(1)由于篇幅限制,下文的分组差异检验只报告主要变量Icw*ct的结果;回归中均加入控制变量,同时控制了年度固定效应和公司固定效应。
(1)限于篇幅,本文没有具体报告稳健性测试过程,资料备索。
基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2017.09.005
中图分类号:F275;F832.51
引用信息:
[1]曾祥飞,林钟高.控制权转移、内部控制重大缺陷与企业绩效--基于企业生命周期视角的实证研究[J].商业经济与管理,2017,No.311(09):46-60.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2017.09.005.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金项目“基于缺陷修复视角的企业内部控制风险免疫能力强化机制研究”(71572002)“内部控制对关系专用性投资价值创造的传导机制研究”(71272220);; 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助;; 江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划资助项目(KYLX15_0195);; 安徽工业大学公司治理与运营研究中心招标项目(SK2015A072)
2017-09-15
2017-09-15