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在中国特殊的经济背景下,股权结构、会计操纵与投资者保护之间有着重要的关系。本文对中国上市公司2004年横截面数据的经验研究表明,在投资者保护缺乏的条件下,控股股东持股比例与会计操纵的概率负相关,控股股东的身份则与会计操纵的概率相关关系不显著。研究结果表明,一股独大并非没有益处,国有股减持和股权分置的解决必须建立在保护投资者利益的基础上,否则将不利于公司治理的优化。
Abstract：Against the special economic background in China,there exists the important relationship between share structure,accounting management and investor protection.Based on the empirical study,the paper holds,without investor protection,the negative correlation of share holding and accounting manipulation and the non-obvious correlation between of shareholder status and accounting manipulation.Because of the deficiency of unreasonable share structure,the diminishing of state share and reallocation must be on the basis of investor protection; otherwise,it will be not beneficial to the optimization of the coporate governance.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2006.04.013
中图分类号:F275
引用信息:
[1]胡凯.股权结构、会计操纵与投资者保护——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].商业经济与管理,2006(04):64-70.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2006.04.013.
2006-04-15
2006-04-15