商业经济与管理

文章运用郝伯特.西蒙的方法分析了雇主和雇工签约和不签约行为的四种组合,指出在正常和规范情况下,双方签约是长期理性的选择,而由于力量失衡、合同不合理、维权成本高等现实因素的加入,会发生偏离长期理性的三组选择行为。文章揭示了雇佣双方不签合同的行为动机。最后提出,国家修改劳动合同法强化对劳动者利益的保护,使雇主不愿与雇工签订劳动合同的问题得以强制性解决,但要真正体现立法宗旨,提高劳动合同的实际签约率,除了行使法的强制力抑制雇主的强势外,还要提高劳动合同法的社会知晓度,保证劳动合同内容的公平性,有效降低雇工的维权成本和后续机会成本,以及消除雇佣双方信息不对称的问题。

This paper applies Herbert Simon's method to analyze the four combinations of behavior in signing of labor contract,pointing out that under normal circumstances it is a long-term rational choice for both employers and employees to sign labor contracts.However,because of the power imbalance,unreasonable contract and higher right-safeguarding costs,both parties will deviate from the long-term rational choice.Furthermore,we find that the recent revision of labor contract law in order to protect the interests of workers affects their behavior of both employers and employees.The improvement of social knowledge about labor contract law,the warranty of fairness,the reduction in right-safeguarding costs and the elimination of information asymmetry are necessary to raise signing rate.