商业经济与管理

经济发展和环境治理是关系社会福利水平的两个重要指标,但具体到地方官员施政中,不同的官员有不同的策略安排。文章首先基于博弈模型构建了一个官员竞争博弈场景,通过逻辑推导,证明官员在竞争博弈中的相对优劣状态差异是导致官员策略差异的原因。其次,运用倾向得分匹配方法实证检验官员策略差异对辖区"经济福利"和"环境福利"的影响。回归结果发现,官员年龄差对环境治理会有不同影响;低于平均年龄的官员在FDI、税收、固定资产投资等"经济福利"指标上显著高于同级官员2.59万元、0.13万元和0.41万元;而高于平均年龄的官员比同级同行在"环境福利"上有更优秀的表现,在固体废弃物、废气、废水等指标上显著低于同级官员的52吨、21吨和6吨。作为弥补,较年轻官员会采取"踩跷跷板"策略,在一些显性环境治理指标上"适度有为",例如提高环保投入占比,以回应中央及公众的关切。从理论分析和实证结果中得到的政策启示是在干部晋升考核体系中应进一步突出"绿色发展"的重要性并强化官员的全局意识,激励官员关注辖区非经济福利。

Economic growth and environmental governance are two important factors in public welfare. However, different governors have different strategy selection in handling local affairs. In this paper, a competition game scene was established based on the Game Theory. Through the scene, we inferred that governors' strategy selection depended on relative advantage or disadvantage. Then the Propensity Score Matching(PSM) was used to measure the economic welfare and environmental welfare under the different strategy selections. The empirical result showed that governors, whose ages were below average, had better performance in economic achievements, while governors, whose ages were above average, had better performance in environmental achievements. Economic indicators(FDI, taxation, fixed asset investment) of the city governed by junior were 25.9 thousand yuan, 1.3 thousand yuan and 4.1 thousand yuan higher than average. To make up for this, younger officials will adopt a "seesaw strategy with moderate ambition" on some explicit environmental target, such as increasing the proportion of government spending, devoted to environmental protection, in response to central and public concerns. Environmental indicators(solid waste, waste gas, waste water) of the senior were 52 t, 21 t and 6 t higher than average. Finally, we put forward some suggestions that cadre promotion assessment system be supposed to highlight green development and overall consciousness of young governor so as to motivate officials to attach importance to noneconomic welfare within the jurisdiction.