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文章以2001-2007年我国上市公司为样本检验机构投资者对上市公司股利分配影响。实证表明,机构持股总体上提高上市公司股利分配的概率和水平,对公司治理起积极作用。但这种作用因终极控制人性质不同而存在显著差异,在非国有控股公司中机构投资者积极治理作用显著,而在国有控股公司中机构投资者治理作用难以充分发挥。因此,管理层应在促进机构投资者发展同时,加强制度建设,克服国有企业固有制度缺陷,为机构投资者积极治理作用发挥提供制度保障。
Abstract：In China,there are not only the conflicts between the shareholders and the management,but also the conflicts between the transferable shareholders and untransferable shareholders.Furthermore,most listed companies in China are state-owned.All these form the special institutional environment for institutional investors.This paper investigates whether institutional investors would affect the dividend of the listed companies under this background during the period 2001-2007.Empirical results show that the institutional shareholders can improve the probability and level of dividend payment;that is,they can improve the corporate governance of listed companies.However,this effect varies considerably according to the properties of the ultimate controlling shareholders of the companies,and it is significant in the non state-owned companies but not in stated-owned companies.So the government should make the institution environment of state-owned companies better.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2011.06.005
中图分类号:F275;F276.6;F224
引用信息:
[1]王彩萍,李善民.终极控制人、机构投资者持股与上市公司股利分配[J].商业经济与管理,2011,No.236(06):26-33.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2011.06.005.
基金信息:
广东省自然科学基金“机构投资者治理作用的制度动因研究”(4203006);; 广东省软科学基金“广东省制度环境对金融机构治理作用影响实证研究”(4202008);; 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(40000-1137109)
2011-06-15
2011-06-15