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基于激励与监督假说以及道德风险假说,理论探讨了董事高管责任保险对企业创新效率的影响和作用机理。研究发现,认购董事高管责任保险能够显著提高企业的创新效率,在进行一系列稳健性检验后上述结论依然成立。在进一步检验中对影响机理的研究发现,董事高管责任保险主要通过容错机制、监督机制对创新效率产生促进作用;同时考虑企业所处内外部治理环境对上述关系的影响,董事高管责任保险对创新效率的促进作用只存在于提供长期股权激励以及处于较高市场竞争环境的企业中;此外,董事高管责任保险对创新效率的改善效果主要体现在显著提高了创新质量并且优化了创新的产出结构。研究结论拓展了企业创新的驱动因素及其作用机理的研究,也为董事高管责任保险在企业中的良性发展提供了实践经验。
Abstract：Based on the hypothesis of incentive and supervision and the hypothesis of moral hazard, this paper theoretically discusses the impact and the functional mechanism of directors' and officers' liability insurance on the innovation efficiency of enterprises. The study finds that the purchase of D&O insurance can significantly improve the innovation efficiency of enterprises, and the above conclusion still holds after a series of robustness tests. The further research on the influence mechanism shows that D&O insurance can promote the innovation efficiency through three ways: fault-tolerant mechanism and supervision mechanism. Considering the influence of internal and external governance environment on the above relationship,further research shows that the improvement effect of directors' liability insurance on innovation efficiency only exists in enterprises that provide long-term incentives and that are in a higher market competition environment.In addition, the improvement effect of D&O insurance on innovation efficiency is mainly reflected in that it significantly improves the high-quality innovation output and optimizes the innovation output structure of enterprises. The conclusion of this paper expands the research on the driving factors of corporate innovation and its mechanism, and also provides practical experience for the benign development of D&O insurance in enterprises.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2020.04.005
中图分类号:F842.6;F272.92
引用信息:
[1]翟淑萍,张晓琳,王敏.董事高管责任保险与企业创新效率——“因势利导”还是“推波助澜”?[J].商业经济与管理,2020,No.342(04):52-67.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2020.04.005.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金面上项目“交易所问询监管的影响因素及治理效应——基于财务报告问询函的证据”(71972140);国家自然科学基金青年项目“环境不确定性、管理者自信与企业创新投资:影响机理与经济后果”(71502119)
2020-04-15
2020-04-15