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文章基于平台型企业“社会人”与“经济人”的双重角色,提出了一种平台自我监管与政府公共监管相协同的二元监管框架,并从理论和案例层面探讨了该框架的福利效应。研究发现:首先,从平台场域内部看,平台自我监管的实质是平台型企业将自身商业行为嵌入社会责任的一种功能,集中体现了平台的“社会人”角色,而其掌握的大数据优势能为这种自我监管功能的实现提供技术支撑。其次,从平台场域外部看,平台型企业之间也在为争夺用户而相互竞争,表现为典型的“经济人”角色,其商业化动机偏差将削弱平台自我监管功能,需要政府公共监管必要的介入。最后,平台自我监管与政府公共监管组成的二元监管框架,在功能目标、技术手段和法律效力三个层面存在既互补又制衡的协同关系,对生产者福利和消费者福利均具有增进作用。上述发现对于“十四五”时期加快推进数字中国建设具有重要的政策启示意义。
Abstract:From the perspective of the“social role”and“economic role”of platform-based enterprises,this paper proposes a dual regulatory framework in which platform self-regulation and government public regulation are coordinated,and theoretically discusses the welfare effects with cases. It is found that: first,from the internal view of the platform,the essence of platform self-regulation is a function of platform-based enterprises to embed their own business behavior into social responsibility,which embodies the“social role”of the platform. The platform's advantages of big data can promote the realization of self-regulation. Second,from the external view of the platform,platform-based enterprises are also competing with each other for users,showing the typical“economic role”. The deviation of their commercialization motivation will weaken the self-regulation efficiency of the platform,and it is necessary for the government to supervise the platform. Third,the dual regulatory framework composed of platform self-regulation and government public regulation has a synergistic relationship of complementation and check-balance on the three levels of functional target,technical measure and legal validity,which can enhance both producer and consumer welfare. The findings have important policy implications for accelerating the construction of digital China during the“14th Five-Year Plan”period.
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(1)根据普华永道(PwC)发布的“2020全球市值100强上市公司”排行榜,美国的微软、苹果、亚马逊、谷歌、脸书和中国的阿里、腾讯七家互联网平台公司位列前十。
(2)参见中国政府网“习近平主持召开中央财经委员会第九次会议”,http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/15/content_5593154.htm。
(3)第三方义务指的是政府指定的私人主体既不是所监督行为的主要实施者,也不是违法行为的受益者,但其承担着必须将私人信息提供给行政机关或者由其本身采取阻止性措施防止有害行为发生的义务[29]。
(4)资料来源:光明网报道《“大数据”提升打假成效令人期待》,https://guancha.gmw.cn/2016-03/15/content_19294829.htm。
(5)资料来源:光明网报道《〈我为群众办实事之局处长走流程〉真诚“触摸”民生痛点》,https://m.gmw.cn/2021-05/07/content_1302278148.htm?source=sohu?source=sohu。
基本信息:
DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2022.05.002
中图分类号:F49
引用信息:
[1]凌永辉.鱼与熊掌兼得:平台经济二元监管框架及其福利效应[J].商业经济与管理,2022,No.367(05):18-27.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2022.05.002.
基金信息:
研究阐释党的十九届五中全会精神国家社会科学基金重大项目“内需主导型全球价值链视角下构建‘双循环’新发展格局研究”(21ZDA007)
2022-05-15
2022-05-15