| 285 | 0 | 87 |
| 下载次数 | 被引频次 | 阅读次数 |
农业企业制度安排及其经济效率是经济运行中一个值得关注的问题。基于农业企业制度安排的现实,可以将农业企业合作生产和剩余分配的制度安排概括划分为固定工资契约制、分成地租契约制和固定地租契约制等三种形式。针对这三种形式,文章在运用逻辑推理、边际分析等方法进行理论分析的基础上,对这三种企业制度安排进行了历史考察、统计分析和实验检验,以说明和论证这三种企业制度安排的经济效率。文章认为,马歇尔税收等价理论和张五常佃农理论有关农业企业制度安排的研究并非完全对立,这两大理论可以在一定程度和范围内协调;关于这一协调,本文在垄断竞争市场的背景下,提出了融合这三种制度安排的激励效应理论,认为农业企业制度安排经过协调后会提升经济效率,并通过对农业企业的实证检验在理论分析层面证实了这一观点。
Abstract:The institutional arrangements and economic efficiency of agricultural enterprises is a problem worth our attention in economic operation. Based on the reality of institutional arrangements in agricultural enterprises,institutional arrangements of agricultural enterprises in cooperative production and residual assignment can be generally divided into three types as fixed wage contract,share tenancy contract and fixed rent contract. This paper conducted theoretical analysis by method of logical reasoning and marginal analysis method etc.,carried on the historical inspection,statistical analysis and experimental verification on the three kinds of institutional arrangements of agricultural enterprises to explain and demonstrate the economic efficiency of the three institutional arrangements. The paper reveals that research on agricultural institutional arrangements of enterprises in the Marshall's tax equivalent theory and Zhang Wuchang's share tenancy theory is not completely opposite and the two theories can be coordinated in a certain degree and range; concerning the coordination between them,on the background of the monopolistic competition market,the paper puts forward the incentive effect theory which integrates the three institutional arrangements and argues if the institutional arrangements of agricultural enterprises are coordinated,the economic efficiency will be improved which is confirmed by the theoretical analysis of the empirical test of agricultural enterprise.
[1]道格拉斯·C·诺思.经济史中的结构与变迁[M].陈郁,罗华平,译.上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994:49-54.
[2]OLSON M.Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1996,10(2):3-24.
[3]HAYEK F.Law,Legislation and Liberty:Rules and Order[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1973:35-54.
[4]齐默尔曼.经济学前沿问题[M].申其辉,译.北京:中国发展出版社,2004:41-50.
[5]WILLIAMSON O E.The New Institutional Economics:Taking Stock,Looking Ahead[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2000,38(3):595-613.
[6]BUCK J L.Chinese Farm Economy[M].Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1930:156-157.
[7]MARSHALL A.Principles of Economics[M].London:Macmillan and Co.,Ltd.,1920:534-537.
[8]SISMONDI J C L S.Political Economy[M].New York:Augustus M.Kelley,1815:41-42.
[9]SMITH A.The Wealth of Nations[M].New York:Modern Library,1776:365-372.
[10]YOUNG A.Travels in France During the Years 1787,1788&1789[M].Berkeley:University of California Press,1792:241-242.
[11]李金铮.矫枉不可过正:从冀中定县看近代华北平原租佃关系的复杂本相[J].近代史研究,2011(11):124-135.
[12]王颜齐,郭翔宇.农地规模化流转背景下的农业雇佣生产合约:理论模型及实证分析[J].中国农村观察,2011(4):65-76.
[13]孔峰,张微.基于固定工资和声誉的国企经理行为动态分析[J].系统管理学报,2012(9):716-720.
[14]张五常.佃农理论——应用于亚洲的农业和台湾的土地改革[M].易宪容,译.北京:商务印书馆,2000:20.
[15]COASE R H.The Nature of the Firm[J].Economica,1937,4(16):386-405.
[16]国家统计局.伟大的十年[M].北京:人民出版社,1959:3-9.
[17]张新光.中国近30年来的农村改革发展历程回顾与展望[J].中国农业大学学报:社会科学版,2006(4):19-23.
[18]全国人民代表大会常务委员会.中华人民共和国农业税条例[EB/OL].(2005-08-19)[2014-07-01].http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/19/content_24853.htm.
[19]中华人民共和国国务院.农民承担费用和劳务管理条例[EB/OL].(1991-12-07)[2014-07-01].http://www.chinalawedu.com/falvfagui/fg22016/6728.shtml.
[20]中华人民共和国国家统计局.中国统计年鉴2013[EB/OL].(2013-10-11)[2014-07-01].http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/indexch.htm.
①科斯定理指出在交易费用为零的情况下,不管权利如何进行初始界定,当事人之间的谈判都会导致资源配置的帕累托最优,而在交易费用不为零的情况下,不同的权利初始界定会带来不同的资源配置,产权制度的设置是优化资源配置的基础。农业企业的固定工资合约制、分成地租合约制和固定地租合约制在实施过程中,交易费用是不为零的,这便涉及到合作剩余分配对资源优化配置的影响。
基本信息:
DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2015.05.004
中图分类号:F324
引用信息:
[1]何大安,胡宗伟.农业企业制度效率的理论分析与实证检验[J].商业经济与管理,2015,No.283(05):31-41.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2015.05.004.
基金信息:
国家教育部人文社科项目“商贸流通的基础理论构建研究”(11JJD790021)
2015-05-15
2015-05-15