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文章通过衡量家族企业中CEO与非家族高管之间的薪酬差距,试图探讨非家族高管的激励问题。依据社会比较理论和锦标赛理论的不同解释逻辑,并基于家族高管与非家族高管的不同特点,文章首先考察影响高管薪酬差距的前因变量,提出非家族CEO与薪酬差距之间关系的竞争性假设,并探讨薪酬差距对企业绩效的影响作用。利用2009-2016年中国家族上市公司数据,研究发现,当非家族成员担任CEO时,CEO与非家族高管之间的薪酬差距减小;另外,薪酬差距与企业绩效呈负相关关系,说明非家族高管中"不均"的薪酬安排会影响企业绩效。综合来看,相比锦标赛理论,社会比较理论对解释家族企业CEO身份对其与非家族高管之间薪酬差距的影响更具预测力与解释力。
Abstract：Much of the research on the pay dispersion of the top management team focuses on the relationship between pay dispersion and firm performance. In this study,we examine antecedent variables which have effects on pay dispersion. On the basis of tournament theory and social comparison theory,we deal with pay dispersion in family firms —pay dispersion between CEO and nonfamily managers,and examine how the non-family CEO influences this pay dispersion,and build competitive hypothesis,then we examine the relationship between pay dispersion and corporate performance. Consistent with this research,a panel data analysis of China listed family firms during 2009—2016 shows that pay dispersion becomes smaller when a non-family member holds the CEO's position. We also provide evidence that pay dispersion is negative to corporate performance,as supported by the social comparison theory. In addition,the results show that non-family managers show greater concern for pay inequality.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2018.11.004
中图分类号:F272.92;F276.5
引用信息:
[1]张玮,陈凌,朱建安.非家族高管更加“患不均”?——家族企业CEO身份对高管薪酬差距的影响研究[J].商业经济与管理,2018,No.325(11):40-50.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2018.11.004.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金面上项目“家族参与对组织二元性及其价值效应的影响机制研究:基于社会情感财富视角”(71672173);; 浙江省社会科学规划重点项目“企业转型驱动下的新生代企业家政治行为与跨代创业研究”(17NDJC031Z);; 浙江省自然科学基金项目“雇亲属还是聘专家:基于控股家族目标异质性的CEO聘任研究”(LY17G020012)
2018-11-15
2018-11-15