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企业引入董事高管责任保险(D&O保险)作为其治理机制的一部分,究竟是使监督机制更加完善从而降低了企业诉讼风险,还是为管理层机会主义动机提供契机、助长了诉讼风险呢?文章以2012-2014年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,基于企业产权性质的差异,研究了D&O保险的引入对企业未来诉讼风险的影响。研究发现,D&O保险的引入会助长企业诉讼风险,然而这种正相关关系在国有企业中不显著,在非国有企业中则十分显著。文章不但有助于全面认识D&O保险治理效应及产权性质对企业的影响,还深化了企业诉讼风险影响因素的研究,对于企业诉讼风险防范也具有重要意义。
Abstract：The Director and Officer's Liability Insurance is introduced into the enterprise as a part of governance system,does it improve this system,thereby reduce the litigation risk? Or provide opportunities for the manager's opportunism motivation so as to boost the litigation risk? TBy using the data of Chinese listed companies between 2012-2014 as sample,based on the difference of the ownership,this paper studies the influence on the litigation risk after the introduction of the D&O insurance. This study has found that the introduction of the D&O insurance will boost the enterprise's litigation risk. However,this positive correlation is not significant in the state-owned enterprises,but very significant in the non-state-owned enterprises. Our research helps us to have a better understanding about the effect of D&O insurance and the influence of ownership,enriches the study of the impact factors of litigation risk and is significant for the enterprise litigation risk prevention.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2016.11.009
中图分类号:F275;F842.69
引用信息:
[1]胡国柳,秦帅.抑制还是助长?董事高管责任保险与企业诉讼风险[J].商业经济与管理,2016,No.301(11):86-97.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2016.11.009.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金项目“中国上市公司D&O保险需求动因及其治理效应研究”(71562010)
2016-11-15
2016-11-15