| 1,405 | 47 | 373 |
| 下载次数 | 被引频次 | 阅读次数 |
基于持股权与控制权非对等配置逻辑,文章以2009—2019年A股国有上市企业为研究主体,实证检验非国有股东超额委派董事对企业现金持有水平的影响。研究发现,非国有股东超额委派董事显著提高参股国企的现金持有水平,且随着超额委派比例增加更加显著;进一步地,该正向作用在中央层级企业及市场化进程较高地区表现更为显著;明晰其作用机理,发现其通过抑制超额持现所致的过度投资行为、迫使无效耗散的现金尽快回流进而提高持现水平;此外,非国有股东超额委派董事和超额委派比例均有助于优化现金二次配置,促使企业将超额现金用于发放现金股利及进行创新投入,并最终提升现金持有价值和企业价值。文章结论不仅印证和延伸混改推进过程中非国有资本在高层治理维度所发挥的积极作用,更为进一步深化混合所有制改革及完善中小股东保护体系提供借鉴。
Abstract:Based on the non-equivalent allocation logic of shareholding and control rights, this paper takes A-share listed stateowned enterprises from 2009 to 2019 as the research subject, and empirically tests the impact of non-state-owned shareholders' overappointed directors on the level of cash holdings of enterprises. The research results show that: directors excessively appointed by non-state-owned shareholders significantly increase the level of cash holdings of state-owned enterprises, and this effect is more significant as the proportion of over-appointment increases. The positive effect is more pronounced in the central enterprises and enterprises in regions with a higher marketization process. By clarifying its mechanism of action, it is found that directors excessively appointed by non-state-owned shareholders mainly suppresses the excessive investment behavior caused by excess cash holdings, forcing the cash that is ineffectively dissipated by enterprises to return as soon as possible, thereby increasing the level of cash holdings.In addition, the directors excessively appointed and the ratio of over-appointment by non-state-owned shareholders can help optimize the secondary allocation of corporate cash, prompting companies to use the increased excess cash to distribute cash dividends and invest in innovation, and ultimately enhance the value of cash holdings and corporate value. The above conclusions not only confirm and extend the positive role played by non-state capital in the high-level governance dimension in the process of mixed ownership reform, but also provide a reference for further deepening the mixed ownership reform and improving the protection system for small and medium shareholders.
[1]冯慧群,郭娜.非国有股东超额委派董事能否提高会计信息质量?——基于国企混改背景[J].会计研究,2021(5):15-31.
[2]郑志刚.“超额委派董事”是与非[J].董事会,2018(Z1):88-89.
[3]刘汉民,齐宇,解晓晴.股权和控制权配置:从对等到非对等的逻辑——基于央属混合所有制上市公司的实证研究[J].经济研究,2018(5):175-189.
[4]MYERS S C,RAJAN R G.The paradox of liquidity[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(3):733-771.
[5]BLANCHARD O J,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A.What do firms do with cash windfalls?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1994,36(3):337-360.
[6]DITTMAR A,MAHRT-SMITH J,SERVAES H.International corporate governance and corporate cash holdings[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):111-133.
[7]沈艺峰,况学文,聂亚娟.终极控股股东超额控制与现金持有量价值的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2008(1):15-23,38.
[8]JENSEN M C.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].The American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[9]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[10]HARFORD J.Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions[J].The Journal of Finance,1999,54(6):1969-1997.
[11]孙晓华,李明珊.国有企业的过度投资及其效率损失[J].中国工业经济,2016(10):109-125.
[12]MEGGINSON W L,ULLAH B,WEI Z.State ownership,soft-budget constraints,and cash holdings:evidence from China's privatized firms[J].Journal of Banking Finance,2014,48(2):276-291.
[13]郑志刚,刘兰欣.所有者缺位与国企混合所有制改革的突破方向[J].经济管理,2022(2):5-16.
[14]OPLER T,PINKOWITZ L,STULZ R,et al.The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,52(1):3-46.
[15]HARFORD J,MANSI S A,MAXWEL W F.Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87(3):535-555.
[16]卢锐,柳建华,许宁.内部控制、产权与高管薪酬业绩敏感性[J].会计研究,2011(10):42-48,96.
[17]马永强,赵良凯,杨华悦,等.空气污染与企业绿色创新——基于我国重污染行业A股上市公司的经验证据[J].产业经济研究,2021(6):116-128.
[18]郝云宏,汪茜.混合所有制企业股权制衡机制研究——基于“鄂武商控制权之争”的案例解析[J].中国工业经济,2015(3):148-160.
[19]马连福,王丽丽,张琦.混合所有制的优序选择:市场的逻辑[J].中国工业经济,2015(7):5-20.
[20]蔡贵龙,柳建华,马新啸.非国有股东治理与国企高管薪酬激励[J].管理世界,2018(5):137-149.
[21]杨兴全,任小毅,杨征.国企混改优化了多元化经营行为吗?[J].会计研究,2020(4):58-75.
[22]辛清泉,黄曼丽,易浩然.上市公司虚假陈述与独立董事监管处罚——基于独立董事个体视角的分析[J].管理世界,2013(5):131-143,175,188.
[23]祝继高,叶康涛,陆正飞.谁是更积极的监督者:非控股股东董事还是独立董事?[J].经济研究,2015(9):170-184.
[24]JIANG W,WAN H,ZHAO S.Reputation concerns of independent directors:evidence from individual director voting[J].Review of Financial Studies,2015,29(3):655-696.
[25]刘运国,郑巧,蔡贵龙.非国有股东提高了国有企业的内部控制质量吗?——来自国有上市公司的经验证据![J].会计研究,2016(11):61-68,96.
[26]马新啸,汤泰劼,蔡贵龙.非国有股东治理与国有企业去僵尸化——来自国有上市公司董事会“混合”的经验证据[J].金融研究,2021(3):95-113.
[27]程仲鸣,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、金字塔结构与地方国有上市公司投资[J].管理世界,2008(9):37-47.
[28]LIN J Y,TAN G.Policy burdens,accountability,and the soft budget constraint[J].The American Economic Review,1999,89(2):426-431.
[29]廖冠民,沈红波.国有企业的政策性负担:动因、后果及治理[J].中国工业经济,2014(6):96-108.
[30]张辉,黄昊,闫强明.混合所有制改革、政策性负担与国有企业绩效——基于1999—2007年工业企业数据库的实证研究[J].经济学家,2016(9):32-41.
[31]杨兴全,李沙沙.沪港通如何影响公司现金持有?[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2020(4):69-80.
[32]杨兴全,杨征,陈飞.业绩考核制度如何影响央企现金持有?——基于《考核办法》第三次修订的准自然实验[J].经济管理,2020(5):140-157.
[33]RICHARDSON S.Over-investment of free cashflow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2 /3):159-189.
[34]DITTMAR A,MAHRT-SMITH J.Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,83(3):599-634.
[35]FAMA E F,FRENCH K R.Taxes,financing decisions and firm value[J].The Journal of Finance,1998,53(3):819-843.
基本信息:
DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2022.12.005
中图分类号:F275;F832.51;F276.1
引用信息:
[1]杨兴全,刘颖.非国有股东超额委派董事与企业现金持有[J].商业经济与管理,2022,No.374(12):55-74.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2022.12.005.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金项目“‘中国之治’的政府行为与企业创新:基于‘国家队’持股的研究”(72062027)
2022-12-15
2022-12-15