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最惠国条款(MFN条款)是买卖双方间的商业安排,平台最惠国条款(PMFN条款)则是一种"第三方协议"。平台不直接决定商品价格是PMFN条款的产生根源,所以不存在批发模式下的PMFN条款。PMFN条款会引发市场竞争中的共谋效应和排他效应,这会导致商品价格提高。目前各国反垄断当局普遍在垄断协议制度下分析PMFN条款的竞争问题,这是一种偏实用主义的做法,主要考虑的是法律适用的便利和传统,而非PMFN条款本身的性质。滥用市场支配地位制度也是规制PMFN条款的必要手段。在认定PMFN条款是否构成垄断协议时,需要注意代理关系的影响。欧美判例都在垄断协议的认定中确立了"代理例外"规则,不过该规则的本意是在代理关系中排除纵向垄断协议的认定,且只认可与代理业务直接相关的限制性内容。当PMFN条款构成横向垄断协议的一部分或者促成了卖方之间的横向共谋时,"代理例外"规则没有适用余地。而且,PMFN条款属于代理人(平台)对本人(卖方)的限制,不符合"代理例外"规则的适用范围。
Abstract：Most favored nation clauses(MFNs) are commercial arrangements between the buyer and the seller, while the platform most favored nation clauses(PMFNs) are third party agreements. In the agency model of sales, the platform does not directly determine the commodity price, which is the origin of PMFNs, so there are no PMFNs in the wholesale model. PMFNs will lead to collusion effects and exclusive effects in market competition, which will lead to the increase of commodity prices. At present, the anti-monopoly authorities in various countries generally analyze PMFNs under the system of monopoly agreements, which is a pragmatic approach, that is, they mainly consider the convenience and tradition of law application, rather than the nature of PMFNs. The system of abuse of dominance is also an essential approach to regulate PMFNs. When determining whether PMFNs are monopoly agreements, we need to pay attention to the influence of agency relationship. Both Europe and America have established the agency exception rule in the determination of monopoly agreements in case law. But the original intention of the rule is to exclude the determination of vertical restrictions in agency relationship, and only recognize the restrictions directly related to agency business. When the PMFNs constitute a part of a horizontal restriction or facilitate collusion between sellers, the agency exception rule has no scope of application. Moreover, the PMFNs are the restrictions of the agent(platforms) to the principal(sellers), which do not fall within the scope of the agent exception rule.
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(1)严格来说,MFN条款未必会导致所有买方的购买价格一致。只有MFN条款的受益人是所有买方时,价格完全一致的情况才会出现。当只有部分买方受益于MFN条款时,受益的买方就获得了最优价格(The Best Price),卖方仍可能对其他买方收取更高价格。所以,也有学者将MFN条款视为一种“最优价格”承诺。参见Jan Peter van der Veer,Antitrust Scrutiny of Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses an Economic Analysis,Journal of European Competition Law & Practice,2013,4(6):501-505,p.501.
(2)2002年5月,欧盟委员会调查了各大好莱坞电影制片厂与欧盟境内一些付费电视广播公司之间的多项MFN条款。他们之间的协议被称为“输出协议”,主要内容是电影制片厂(卖方)在一定时期内将电影转播权出售给付费电视广播公司(买方)。合同中的MFN条款使得电影制片厂有权获得付费电视广播公司与其他任何电影制片厂达成的最优惠条件。欧盟委员会经初步评估认为,这些条款导致不同付费电视广播公司支付给电影制片厂的价格出现了反竞争性的一致,涉嫌违反《欧盟竞争法》。不过在2004年10月,6家电影制片厂决定从“输出协议”中撤回MFN条款后,欧盟委员会结束了对这几家企业的调查程序。具体内容可参见欧盟委员会的新闻报道:Commission closes investigation into contracts of six Hollywood studios with European pay-TVs,IP/04/1314,Brussels,26 October 2004.
(3)United States v.General Electric Co.,1977 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 13977.
(4)严格来说,将平台与商家之间的关系界定为代理可能不太准确,就像线下商场和商场内卖方的关系一样,前者只是提供柜台及相应服务(如搜索、比较、支付、物流及部分售后),并不直接参与商品销售,所以谈不上是后者的代理人,二者之间并非民法意义上的代理关系。不过,目前反垄断法文献都将这种卖方保留商品所有权和定价权的平台销售模式称为代理,这里的“代理”只是一种模糊说法,不具有民法上代理的严格意义,或者说是一种“准代理”。
(5)United States v.Apple Inc.,952 F.Supp.2d 638 (2013).United States v.Apple,Inc.,791 F.3d 290 (2015).
(6)Bundeskartellamt,HRS-Hotel Reservation Service,9th Decision Division,B9- 66/10,20 December 2013.
(7)Bundeskartellamt,Booking.com B.V,9th Decision Division,B9-121/13,22 December 2015.
(8)Office of Fair Trading,Hotel online booking:Decision to accept commitments to remove certain discounting restrictions for Online Travel Agents (31 January 2014).
(9)Case COMP/AT.39847-E-Books.
(10)Case AT.40153 E-book MFNs and related matters (Amazon).
(11)Competition and Markets Authority,Amazon online retailer:investigation into anti-competitive practices,https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/amazon-online-retailer-investigation-into-anti-competitive-practices,last access on April 17,2021.
(12)CMA,Private motor insurance market investigation,Final report,24 September 2014,para.12.17,para.12.65.
(13)United States v.GE Co.,272 U.S.476 (1926),p.488.
(14)Simpson v.Union Oil Co.,377 U.S.13(1964),p.16,p.20,p.21.
(15)Case 22-71,Béguelin Import Co.v.S.A.G.L.Import Export,Judgment of the Court of 25 November 1971,para.8.
(16)Joined cases 40 to 48,50,54 to 56,111,113 and 114-73,Co?peratieve Vereniging “Suiker Unie” UA and others v.Commission of the European Communities,Judgment of the Court of 16 December 1975,para.539.
(17)Case C-266/93,Bundeskartellamt v.Volkswagen AG and VAG Leasing GmbH.,Judgment of the Court of 24 October 1995,para.19.
(18)Case C-217/05,Confederación Espaňola de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v.Compaňía Espaňola de Petróleos SA,Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 December 2006,paras.38,41,43.
(19)United States v.Masonite Corp.,316 U.S.265 (1942),p.276.
(20)In re Local TV Adver.Antitrust Litig.,2020 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 208215,p.52,p.54,p.55.
基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2021.05.006
中图分类号:D912.29
引用信息:
[1]焦海涛.互联网平台最惠国条款的反垄断法适用[J].商业经济与管理,2021,No.355(05):72-84.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2021.05.006.
基金信息:
北京市社会科学基金项目“反垄断法视野下的企业数据行为治理”(20FXC019)
2021-05-15
2021-05-15