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为解决营销渠道中的代理问题,学界探索了一系列有效的治理机制来规范二元渠道关系,但针对二元渠道关系的治理机制无法解决三元渠道关系网络中的代理问题。文章依托代理理论,以三元渠道网络为分析单位,在以往研究基础上进一步实证检验制造商“跨桥”治理机制的双重治理效果和制造商市场地位的调节作用。研究结果表明,制造商“跨桥”治理机制具有“双刃剑”效应:当制造商的市场地位较低时,制造商“跨桥”治理机制具有促进与经销商间的信息共享的积极效果,但也具有降低经销商对制造商的承诺的消极效果,且这种消极效果在制造商的市场地位较高时得到强化。
Abstract:Marketing scholars have explored a range of effective governance mechanisms to address agency problems and regulate dyadic channel relationships.However,governance mechanisms designed for dyadic channels do not solve agency problems within triadic channels.Based on the agency theory and previous research,this study examines the double-edged governance effects of a governance mechanism named Manufacturer Triadic Governance (MTG) and the contingent effects of manufacturers’market status.The results indicate that MTG exhibits a double-edged effect on distributors.When the manufacturer’s market status is low,MTG has a positive effect in promoting distributor information sharing.But MTG also has a negative effect in reducing distributor commitment,particularly when the manufacturer’s market status is high.
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基本信息:
DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2024.02.006
中图分类号:F274
引用信息:
[1]张闯,贾齐,张志坤.解决三元渠道网络中的代理问题:制造商“跨桥”治理机制的治理效果[J].商业经济与管理,2024,No.388(02):87-97.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2024.02.006.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重大项目“‘双循环’新格局下现代流通体系创新及高质量发展路径研究”(21&ZD120); 国家自然科学基金面上项目“三元渠道网络中的投机行为:企业反应策略与治理机制研究”(71772031); 浙江省自然科学基金项目“企业渠道关系韧性构建:治理机制选择、边界条件及其作用结果”(LQ23G020006)
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