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文章以2002-2012年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证检验分析师关注对薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现,分析师关注显著提高了薪酬业绩敏感性,在一定程度上发挥了外部监督作用。进一步研究表明,明星分析师关注对薪酬业绩敏感性的影响更为显著;相对于民营企业,分析师关注对国有企业薪酬业绩敏感性的影响程度更大。本文的研究为分析师关注对公司治理的影响研究提供了增量证据,同时对完善薪酬激励契约具有参考价值。
Abstract：By taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2002 to 2012 as sample,this paper empirically tests the impact of the analyst coverage on the compensation-performance sensitivity. The results show that analyst coverage significantly increases compensation-performance sensitivity and plays an important role in external supervision to a certain extent. Further study suggests that famous analyst coverage can impose a greater influence on compensation-performance sensitivity,and the influence of analyst coverage on compensation-performance sensitivity in state-owned companies can be greater than that in private companies. This research can offer incremental evidence to the research of the impact of analyst coverage on corporate governance and provide valuable reference for the improvement of compensation-incentive contract.
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①本文中证券分析师关注企业是指证券分析师对某企业进行盈利预测并发布研究报告;在计算关注企业的分析师人数时只计算在报告中署名的第一个分析师;同一个分析师当年多次对某企业进行预测的,不重复计算关注人数。
基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2015.07.004
中图分类号:F832.51;F272.92;F271
引用信息:
[1]李晓玲,胡欢,刘中燕.分析师关注与薪酬业绩敏感性:基于职业声誉和产权性质视角[J].商业经济与管理,2015,No.285(07):34-45.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1336/f.2015.07.004.
基金信息:
教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目“证券分析师对会计信息质量的影响:理论分析与检验证据”(13YJA790053);; 安徽省教育厅人文社科重大项目“上市公司社会责任信息披露指标体系及机制研究”(SK2014ZD008);; 安徽大学研究生学术创新研究项目
2015-07-15
2015-07-15